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Rwanda is among the smallest countries (26,388 km2) in sub-Saharan Africa with 
approximately ninety percent of its population engaged in agricultural or agriculturally 
related activities.  Of the thirty-two percent of arable land, only ten percent is permanent 
cropland, contributing to significant levels of land scarcity.  Forests and land employed 
for other uses cover approximately twelve and forty-five percent of the land, 
respectively.1  Primary commodity export dependence characterizes the economy in that 
ninety-nine percent of its exports are of primary commodities, with coffee comprising 
between fifty and eighty percent of total exports.2   
The Rwandan agricultural production system is consumption driven in that 
farmers tend to grow a mixture of products to satisfy subsistence needs.3  The capacity to 
grow sufficient food at the household level is a symbol of pride; Rwandans consider 
purchasing food, to provide an adequate supply to family members, to be undignified and 
a sign of poverty.  On most farms, however, soil exhaustion has limited productivity.  As 
family plots are increasingly fragmented due to generational transfers, farmers 
intensively cultivate their land to sustain production.  Increases in agricultural production, 
however, have come at a high cost: increased environmental degradation.  A historically 
inequitable distribution of land, coupled with increased rates of environmental 
degradation, exacerbated tensions associated with resource scarcity and contributed, we 
argue, to the Rwandan genocide. 
Resource scarcities, however, are unlikely to, by themselves, generate a genocidal 
conflict.  While resource scarcities may provide an economic incentive for conflict, we 
must place these scarcities into a framework within which genocide can be planned and 
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implemented.  Only if we examine the interaction between resource scarcities and the 
accumulation of human capital in Rwanda can we infer how these factors contributed to 
the genocide.4 
While we normally expect to see a positive relationship between educational 
attainment and social and economic wellbeing, a pattern exists in which “educated” elites 
have instigated and led rebellions and conflicts.  Hutchinson, for example, argues that the 
war in Southern Sudan between the Nuer and Dinka tribes (1991-1999) was the “war of 
the educated.”5  From the civilian perspective, leaders imposed the war on the population.  
A tribal chief showed evidence of this in his statement: “The educated make us fight.”6  
In neighboring Ethiopia, intellectuals led the rebellion that toppled the feudal government 
of Emperor Haile Selassie, while in Rwanda intellectuals played a significant role in the 
protracted conflict and resulting genocide.  
The fact that improvements in educational attainment increase political 
awareness, provoking latent conflicts, is a problematic issue in conflict prone states.    
The government can more easily shape public perception with increasing literacy and 
widespread access to mass media. While education policy delivered through good 
governance may promote unity and democratic principles, the reverse is true if education 
policy is in the hands of an authoritarian state.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  We first discuss the 
accumulation of human capital in Rwanda.  We examine the evolution of human capital 
prior to and during the colonial period.  We then consider how institutions developed by 
the Belgian colonial administration influenced further evolution of human capital after 
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independence, during, and after the genocide.  We then debate resource scarcities in a 
similar framework.  The last section concludes and offers policy advice. 
Human Capital Accumulation Prior to Independence 
Pre-colonial education in Rwanda was largely informal.  Parents and relatives 
educated their children regarding Rwandan cultures and values throughout their 
childhood in a community-based system or itorero.7  This method emphasized practical 
work skills as well as traditional storytelling and dancing.  The community trained boys 
and girls separately and according to their future responsibilities, expecting boys to 
follow in their father’s footsteps and become the head of the household, while teaching 
girls housekeeping and child rearing duties. 
Roman Catholic Church missionaries introduced the modern Rwandan school in 
1908 and educated the majority of students throughout the colonial period (Table 1).8  
The colonial administration, in order to reduce costs, relied on missionaries to provide 
education and public health services, a policy that continued throughout the colonial 
period.9  In return for the missionaries’ contribution in providing education and other 
public services, the Belgians cooperated with the missionaries’ evangelistic efforts.  
While the goals of the missionaries were to evangelize the population and school the 
future leaders of Rwanda, the provision of these services was not free of bias.10  
Missionaries, in tacit cooperation with the colonial administration, separated students by 
ethnicity and crafted a curriculum to reinforce the roles of the various ethnic groups.11 
Earmarking Tutsi students for training as future elite, missionaries provided meat-
based meals and milk while only giving the Hutus, who were to play the traditional role, 
maize porridge and beans.12  The missionaries further established a curriculum that 
exacerbated the Tutsi-Hutu division and reinforced the missionaries’ belief that the Tutsi 
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were dominant and the Hutu subservient.  High rates of university tuition relative to per-
capita income further compounded admissions and attendance bias.13  The percentage of 
Hutu college students, for example, in the province of Butare (previously Astrida) 
declined from 16.6% in 1932 to 6.1% by 1945, an illustration of the institutional bias 
against Hutu students seeking higher education.  If Hutus completed secondary or post-
secondary education, employment opportunities were limited to labor-intensive vocations 
or the seminary.  Merely being Hutu resulted in cultural and economic bias that 
reinforced the Hutu perception that Rwanda was a Tutsi-dominated enterprise.  The 
systematic denial of opportunities bred a growing frustration and embitterment that, in 
part, enabled the 1959 Hutu revolution.14   
By 1951, the number of black, primarily Tutsi, Rwandan priests had grown 
sufficiently to threaten the power of white missionaries. Concurrently, educated Tutsi 
started to agitate for self-government, leading the Belgians to conclude that the Tutsi 
were no longer reliable partners in the administration of Rwanda.15  The internal 
dynamics of the Roman Catholic missionaries also fostered a sense of change; more 
liberal Flemish clerics began to replace conservative clerics from southern Belgium.16  
Within a short period of time, the colonial administration and the Roman Catholic Church 
modified their policy towards the Hutu, favoring the Hutu and relegating the Tutsi to 
second-class status.   
Apart from supporting the Hutu’s cause for justice, the Church also supplemented 
its logistical needs. The Hutus used the Church’s weekly publication, Kinyamateka, to 
disseminate their views and to debate prominent issues.  While the level of countryside 
literacy was very low, Kinyamateka was the main source of information for rural people 
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and proved to be an effective organ for the educated Hutu to openly confront the Tutsi.  
The abrupt change in attitudes and policies, however, could not undo the impact of 
decades of discriminatory policies on the distribution of human capital, employment 
opportunities, political power, and wealth. 
Shifting attitudes among educators, of favoring one ethnic group to another, 
characterized the pre-independence educational system in Rwanda.  Use of the mass 
media radicalized the latent conflict, which, after 1951, raised the awareness among 
Hutus that the Tutsi-ran state had relegated the Hutu to second-class citizenship.  This 
policy change led to the eventual victory of the Hutu political party, in turn leading to 
Rwanda’s independence in 1962.  Tainting independence, however, was an unequal 
distribution of human capital; the Tutsi minority had a proportionally larger share of the 
population considered to be highly educated, while the Hutu minority was predominately 
the politically elite.   
Human Capital Accumulation Post-Independence 
With the concentration of political power in the Hutu elites, the question of 
reforming the educational system, to promote the acquisition of human capital across 
ethnic groups, quickly fell by the wayside.  Ethnic discourse had always been used as a 
means to divert attention away from inner contradictions within Hutu elites.17  
Consequently, the Hutu elites fostered a policy of segregation in order to maintain power 
and extend their political dominance. 
The Church continued to play a major role in educating Rwandans as Church 
involvement in education and other social programs conserved state funds.18  As before, 
this relationship proved beneficial to both sides.  Church involvement reduced 
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government expenditures and increased the legitimacy of the state, while the state 
sanctioned the activities of the Church.  
Post-independence Rwanda saw the legacy of the colonial period applied in 
reverse.  The Rwandan government systematically discriminated against the Tutsi, 
including the area of education.  Educators assigned students identification files, 
requiring them to identify their ethnicity as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.19  Rwandan history and 
civics teachings emphasized ethnicity, reinforcing social divisions, and incorporated, 
deliberately, the Tutsi myth in the curriculum.20  The Hutu government, in effect, 
intentionally sought to bias the development of human capital to favor the Hutu. 
Utterwulghe finds that the Hutu elite propaganda policy successfully validated the 
history they chose to convey in that the policy became the reality.21  Despite 
discrimination, the Tutsi within Rwanda lived fairly well, both socially and 
economically.22  Proportionally, they still retained a larger share of the economic and 
governmental resources with respect to their demographic segment.23  Years of colonial 
rule favoring the Tutsi minority produced hundreds of thousands of Tutsi who, at the time 
of Rwanda’s independence, were wealthy and well educated.  As described in the 
previous section, although the Belgians reversed the educational policy in the late 1950s 
the disparity between educated Tutsi and Hutu remained starkly evident.  
In 1975, the Rwandan government introduced a quota system as the criterion for 
admission into secondary education thus making entrance extremely competitive due to 
limited available places in public secondary schools.24  In response to both constraints, 
parents set up private secondary schools.  Unfortunately, many of these schools had poor 
teaching, and were not approved by the government, thereby denying graduates entry into 
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higher education.  Often considered “education for the poor,” these private schools 
mainly developed in rural areas.  Ironically, since these schools had no access to 
government subsidies or assistance from donors, the rural poor bore the contributions and 
fees to support their children’s schooling. 
Many Rwandans did not complete an education beyond primary school (Tables 2 
and 3), making them susceptible to information purveyed by the political elite.  The 
failure of the education system in Rwanda to instill morality and openness in the 
intellectual thinking manifested in the events that led to the genocide.  As Prunier 
observed, “[i]n the hysteria of Rwanda in April 1994, almost anybody might turn into a 
killer. But the responsibility lies with the educated people—with those in positions of 
authority, however small, who did not have the strength (or maybe even the wish) to 
question the poisonous effluents carried by their cultural stream.”25 
The Role of Human Capital in the Genocide 
A large numbers of faculty members at the national universities were active 
supporters of the Hutu government because the admission to higher education was 
dependent on a quota based on ethnicity and region.  Those who taught at the university 
or other government-sponsored educational institutions understood firmly that 
advancement in their career, and perhaps continued employment, depended largely on 
supporting government positions.  Des Forges strengthens this argument by noting in her 
report, that “[b]oth those within Rwanda and those studying abroad wrote letters and 
made public statements that reported facts wrongly or misinterpreted data to support the 
official line.”26 
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Rwandan academicians were, for example, actively and notoriously involved in 
administering and enforcing the propaganda against the Tutsi.  Dr. Ferdinand Nahimana, 
the director of the Rwandese Information Office (ORINFOR) and one of Rwanda’s most 
distinguished historians, administered the radio station that broadcast anti-Tutsi 
propaganda.  He gained notoriety when Radio Rwanda broadcast false news reports that 
charged the Tutsi-based Liberal Party of “advocating the terrorist killing of twenty-two 
leading Hutu, politicians, army officers, civil servants, priests, businessmen, and 
lawyers,” on March 3, 1992.27  The very next day, Interahamwe militia began to kill Tutsi 
and burnt their huts in the Southern region of Rwanda.  Approximately 300 people were 
killed during the six-day massacre.28  In response to this incident and the results protests 
from Western ambassadors, the Rwandan government dismissed Nahimana and 
appointed him as a counselor to Rwanda’s ambassador in Bonn.  The German 
government, however, rejected Nahimana and returned to him to his university post 
where he argued that “Radio Rwanda had been infiltrated by agents of the Rwanda 
Patriotic Front [(RPF)], backed by evil foreign diplomats determined to undermine Hutu 
self-defense.”29  The Rwandan government later appointed Nahimana to Radio-Television 
Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC), undoubtedly the most effective propaganda medium 
in Rwanda and an instrument of the genocide.30 
Radio was, arguably, the most effective means of delivering the message of hate 
and shaping public perspectives due to high levels of illiteracy.  The RTLMC gained 
popularity because its broadcasts combined music and informal conversation that was 
targeted to the rural population.  Extreme levels of poverty, however, meant that only 29 
percent of all households had a radio in 1991.31 
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Other methods of delivering propaganda, however, were available to the Hutu 
regime.  The Kigali newspaper Kangura aggressively attacked Tutsis after RPF attacks in 
1990.32  Other newspapers and journals soon followed.  Urban workers usually carried 
copies of Kangura home on the weekends, although it was published and sold in the 
Kigali capital.33  At this time, approximately 52 percent of Rwandans were literate, and 
by reading to those that could not read, they effectively disseminated the propaganda 
throughout the community.  The Hutu regime put to use all available human capital to 
spread the hate that fueled the genocide. 
We must also recognize that active participation in the genocide was not limited 
to the educated elite or to those who participated in mass media.  Hutu teachers either 
condemned their Tutsi pupils to the militia or killed the students themselves.34  Thirty-
two of forty-nine ringleaders of the genocide in Nyakizu, for example, were teachers.  
Evidence abounds that Tutsis who attempted to seek refuge in school compounds were 
systematically denounced and murdered.  The implications of the participation of the 
educated in the genocide on post-genocide Rwanda are staggering. 
Human Capital Accumulation Post-Genocide 
The post-genocide government inherited what was left over in terms of human 
capital. As a direct result of the genocide, approximately 1,000 university students 
perished at three branches of the National University of Rwanda.35  Within the small 
minority of Tutsi students in the university, few survived the genocide while most of the 
Hutu students fled the country. The Hutu regime killed over fifty instructors and one 
hundred and fifty staff members, also turning dozens of professors into refugees.36 
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University and schools’ compounds were destroyed while laboratory equipment and 
books were looted.  
The enrollment of students in specific programs does not, arguably, reflect the 
needs of Rwanda.  For example, although over 90 percent of Rwanda is involved in 
agriculture, 33.9 percent of the students are registered in economics or social and 
management sciences; 16.9 percent study law and 10.1 percent, the arts.  Other programs, 
we argue, may be more relevant given agriculture’s importance in the Rwandan 
economy.  We observe a potential bias against programs we view as pertinent to the 
health of the Rwandan economy, noting that, for example, only 3.59 percent of the 
students registered in science, 3.6 percent in agronomy, 5.0 percent in educational 
sciences and 6.2 percent in applied sciences.37  Curiously, the Rwandan government has 
not encouraged an improved match between the needs of the Rwandan economy and the 
output of its higher educational institutions.   
Given the potential of education to bring about national reconciliation, poverty 
reduction and economic development, the Rwandan government must make the national 
curriculum for primary and secondary schooling a priority.  Tragically, although the 
government was aware of the negative messages contained in the textbooks, teaching and 
learning materials remain unchanged, continuing until 2002 to disseminate the past 
culture of ethnic stereotypes.  Finally, in September 2002, the government established a 
new textbook policy and a three-year plan for the review and revision of the primary 
school curricula and textbooks.38  
In general, post-genocide educational reconstruction revolves around the 
implementation of a durable educational policy, quality and relevancy of education, 
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accessibility and equality, eradication of illiteracy, and capacity building in science and 
technology.39  To aid educational reconstruction efforts, the Rwandan government is 
undertaking a number of steps and is setting goals for improvement.  First, the 
government seeks to provide universal primary education by 2010 and basic education 
for all by 2015.  Second, the government set the target to, in the next twenty years, 
establish Rwanda as a regional service and information center chiefly to attract foreign 
investment.  Although these targets appear very promising, we question how much 
progress revising the curriculum and issuing new textbooks and materials will make; this 
endeavor will require a substantial financial commitment on the part of the government 
Compounding the problem of financial resources is the fact that, within public 
and private subsidized schools, most teachers have not completed a secondary education. 
After the genocide the proportion of qualified teachers fell from sixty to thirty-three 
percent while, at the same time, class sizes loomed with anywhere from sixty to eighty 
students per class.40  The student intake capacity today is still limited and unevenly 
distributed among districts.41  Schools work under extremely precarious material 
conditions with teaching supplies largely limited to blackboards as other equipment may 
either be missing, not functioning, or non-existent. 
In general, most schools lack sufficient resources; textbooks are in acute shortage 
and are not yet published in Rwanda.  In some instances, schools either use laboratories 
donated by aid organizations ineffectively or not at all.  Rwanda’s schools are in poor 
condition with a need for significant improvements in water and sanitation facilities.  
Obvious financial and infrastructure challenges remain before the Rwandan government 
can implement an effective program of human capital accumulation.  When we couple 
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these challenges with the specter of resource scarcity, we observe that the confluence of 
incentives, that influenced the development and implementation of the genocide, remain 
in Rwanda to this day. 
 Resource Scarcity Prior to Independence 
During the pre-colonial period, the Mwami delegated the management of land 
resources and the administration of districts through his appointed chiefs called 
“umutware w’ubutaka”  or chief of landholding, “umutware w’umukenke” or chief of 
pastures and “umutware w’ingabo” or the chief of men.42  In every district these three 
chiefs worked independently of one another according to their line of jurisdiction and 
also engaged in continuous reciprocal surveillance for the benefits of the inhabitants.43 
This mechanism provided a check and balance on the authority of each of the chiefs. 
Four principles governed the use of land in the pre-colonial period.  First, the head 
of the clan clearing forested land would invoke “Ubukonde,” or clan law to settle several 
families called “abagererwa” who would, in turn, pay a land tax to the head of the clan.  
The umutware w’umukenke also had “igikingi,” or the right to establish a land domain.  
He in turn distributed the available land to the pastoral families.  Initially, the clan did not 
require tenants on igikingi to provide food or services in compensation for the use of the 
land, but this changed during the reign of Mwami Rwabugiri (1860 to 1895).44   As such, 
the clan required the tenants on igikingi to pay compensation to the umutware 
w’umukenke for the use of the igikingi.   
Second, a system of cattle ownership “ubuhake” or cattle contract or clientship 
also existed during the pre-colonial period.  A cattle owner could allocate a number of 
cattle to an employee in exchange for his service.45  While working conditions were 
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harsh, ubuhake provided a mechanism by which a landless person could obtain cattle.  In 
essence, ubuhake allowed for upward mobility in the pre-colonial period.  Third, a system 
of customary law or  “Inkungu” authorized the local political authority to dispose of the 
escheated or abandoned land.46  Fourth, the “gukeba” (also known as kugaba) a process 
of settling families into grazing land or on fallow land existed.  These principles 
recognized land rights obtained in one of three ways: inheritance (through the male line), 
allotment by one of the chiefs, or the clearing of land to which no chief has laid claim.47 
The Germans recognized Mwamian authority over the land, resulting in an 
initially unchanged land tenure system during the German colonial period.  The advent of 
the Belgian colonial administration in 1918, however, radically altered the land tenure 
system.  Viewing the tripartite land tenure system as unwieldy, the Belgians attempted to 
dismantle it in favor of a centralized system.  The Belgians introduced a land tenure 
system based on two guiding principles: no indigenous Rwandan should be dispossessed 
of their land and all vacant land belonged to the state.48  Clearly these provisions initiated 
a dual system of land administration, subjecting all occupied lands to customary law 
while written law benefited the colonialist and the missionaries. 
Shifting their support towards the Hutu, in 1954 the Belgian administration 
introduced a new law abolishing ubuhake.49  The Belgians felt that ubuhake bound poor 
people, usually Hutus lacking cattle or land for cultivation, to powerful protectors, who 
were usually cattle-rich Tutsi.50  Whether ubuhake actually created a system of 
indentured servitude remains a matter of debate.  We do know that the elimination of the 
ubuhake created a new landless class of Hutu who possessed cattle.  Without a dedicated 
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grazing area, competition for scarce grazing lands increased, environmental degradation 
worsened, and ethnic relations grew tenser. 
Compounding this multi-faceted problem, the Belgian administration introduced 
“paysannats” due to high population density and the need to explore new areas.51 
Paysannats were similar to gukebas but consisted of giving each family two hectares for 
cultivating crops such as cotton and coffee.52  The explicit bias against cattle grazing in 
favor of exportable agricultural products disrupted existing social and economic norms.  
The increasing emphasis on exportable products also increased the competition for arable 
lands and created an incentive for Hutus to seize Tutsi grazing lands.  During the 1959 
Hutu revolution, Hutus seized land and cattle belonging to the thousands of Tutsis who 
were either killed or fled to neighboring countries.53  The competition for economic 
resources, we argue, fueled ethnic tensions and created the perverse incentive to increase 
institutional bias against the Tutsi. 
Resource Scarcity Post-Independence  
Soon after independence, the government embarked on a resettlement project by 
moving over 80,000 farmers and their families from the densely populated northeastern 
areas (Gikongoro, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Kibuye) to the western and southern part of 
the country.54  The government also attempted to rapidly increase agricultural production 
through the conversion of primarily Tutsi-owned pasture lands into Hutu-owned 
cultivated lands.  An unintended consequence of this policy was a rapid decrease in the 
production of manure, a decrease that could not be offset with manufactured fertilizers 
due to resource constraints.  The government’s policy simultaneously increased ethnic 
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tensions, environmental degradation, and dependence on export crops.  We illustrate the 
transition in the utilization of land in Table 4. 
In 1976, the government increased its role in the sale of land.  The minister in 
charge of lands now had to provide permission for any land transaction and the seller had 
to have at least two hectares of land remaining.  The buyer’s maximum ownership of land 
was specifically constrained at two hectares.55  After 1976, the only land titles recognized 
by the state were those registered with the state; all other lands were considered state 
property.  As a result of this policy, in the densely populated areas, such as Ruhengeri 
and Butare, the number of land transactions increased significantly.56  Many peasants also 
resorted to renting land for a number of years as a means of survival.57 The increasing 
fragmentation of family holdings through generational transfers and population pressures 
compounded problem of land scarcity. Between 1960 and 1990, for example, population 
density per hectare of cultivable land had nearly tripled (Table 5). 
Land scarcity contributed to internal and external migration during this period. 
People sought to move out of the densely populated areas to escape environmental 
degradation and economic marginalization.  Youth, on the other hand, desired to move 
from rural to urban areas in the search for economic opportunities.  The government 
attempted to limit migration by requiring government permission for residence 
relocation, although there is no consensus on whether this policy actually influenced 
migration flows.   
Economic conditions worsened in 1989 when the price of coffee declined by 
approximately 50% on the world market.  The policy of export crop promotion had 
increased Rwanda’s dependence on income generated from coffee exports; income that 
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declined significantly with the fall in coffee prices.  A significant devaluation of the 
Rwanda currency soon followed, with a significant curtailment of public subsidies and 
services.  As an increasing number of Rwandans relied on agricultural production, 
environment degradation (soil erosion, soil exhaustion, destruction of watersheds) 
coupled with economic marginalization (decreased coffee and tin prices), increased 
economic pressures on Hutus and Tutsis alike.   
Concurrently, the Ugandan government denied Tutsi refugees residency in 
Uganda and pressured them to move back to Rwanda.  The Rwandan government, 
believing the insurgency to be operating in the interests of the Tutsis, refused to 
accommodate the Tutsi refugees, fueling the RFP insurgency.  RFP attacks created 
another significant movement of the Rwandan population, from the North to the South, 
further fueling the competition for already scarce resources.  With a large pool of 
unemployed youth and a lack of economic opportunities, it should have come as no 
surprise that the youth became the soldiers of the genocide. 
Resource Scarcity and Its Contribution to the Genocide  
We argue that environmental degradation and the increasing economic 
marginalization of the Hutu in Rwanda contributed to the genocide.  Environmental 
degradation, population density, and internally displaced populations lowered agricultural 
productivity and yields.  Lower yields, coupled with declining prices for exported 
oriented crops, significantly reduced rural incomes.  Declining incomes further 
marginalized the landless, the rural and urban poor, and the disaffected youth.  The 
perceived concentration of assets (land, cattle, and other forms of wealth) in the hands of 
the Tutsi created a desire for the appropriation of these assets through violent means. 
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The government incentivized participation in the genocide by developing a 
mechanism for the pooling and distribution of assets of the Tutsi killed during the course 
of the genocide.  Explicit rewards in the form of Tutsi land, cattle, and other forms of 
property were made to recruit and motivate the participants of the genocide.58  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that most of the participants in the genocide fought not because of their 
hatred of the Tutsi but for land, crops, and cattle.  Responsible for the disposition of Tutsi 
assets, Burgomasters, to facilitate their disposition, created asset inventory lists and 
matched them to a list of those killed.59  The list facilitated the conduct of the genocide 
by distinguishing between Tutsi households that had been eliminated (thus rendering 
their assets available for distribution) and those households who had surviving members, 
requiring further killings before the Burgomasters distributed their seized assets.  
Case study evidence appears to lend credence to the hypothesis that the genocide 
disproportionately targeted relatively wealthy Tutsi, Twa, or ‘moderate’ Hutu.60  In the 
commune of Kanama, situated in the Perfecture of Gisenyi, 26.8% of individuals 
characterized as landowners were killed during the genocide compared to 5.4% of the 
population of 596 inhabitants.  From an economic perspective, the genocide may have 
been, in part, a murderous mechanism of asset redistribution. 
Resource Scarcity Post Genocide 
The post-genocide period in Rwanda can be characterized by the significant 
movements of individuals in the search of safety, land and economic opportunities.  First, 
approximately 800,000 refugees who had emigrated prior to 1994 returned to Rwanda 
devoid of assets.61  Second, there were approximately one million internally displaced 
people after the genocide in 1994.62  Third, in 1996 and 1997, approximately 1.4 million 
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refugees returned from Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire.  Fourth, insurgency activity 
increased during 1997 and 1998 resulted in the internal displacement of approximately 
600,000 people from the prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri.63  
The government had limited success in resolving these issues.  In an effort to 
soothe tensions, the government allowed temporary occupation of abandoned land by 
some of the 1959-1993 refugees.  The government also permitted refugees to temporarily 
settle on state lands.  In the provinces of Kibungo, Umutara, and Kigali Rural, the 
government, in a policy called “imidugudu” or villagisation, divided family plots between 
the owners and the old case refugees.  This policy called for the construction of houses in 
settlement sites that effectively grouped all rural dwellers into villages as opposed to the 
traditional method of living.64 
The government auspiciously perceived several advantages in implementing the 
“imidugudu” or villagisation policy.  First, having the population concentrated in villages 
mitigated the costs of basic service provision (water, sanitation, health, education).65  
Second, in a village setting, the government could more easily connect roads and 
communication networks to support market access and off-farm income generating 
activities. Third, the government though the imidugudu would enhance security; 
concentrated population in villages are more secure.  The government also thought that 
the concentration of the population could simultaneously hinder insurgents from securing 
hideouts and covert support.  By distancing farmers from their land, the emotional 
attachment to the land as a part of a family heritage would, it was thought, decline over 
time.  Farmers would thus treat land as an economic good without familial attachment. 
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Unfortunately, a practical implementation of the imidugudu policy in the midst of 
the urgency to meet the housing needs of a huge number of people within a short period 
of time created problems.  First, the government inadequately planned and poorly chose 
sites for many of the projects, resulting in disastrous social, economic and environmental 
outcomes.66  The decision to locate the imidugudus that were far from the farmland 
caused a significant fall in food production in some areas.  Understandably, the 
availability of land governed the site selection process since high population density and 
acute shortage of land remained as the greatest challenge for Rwanda.   
The shortage of public or state land forced the imidugudu to be installed on the 
private lands.  Lacking sufficient resources to compensate the property owners whose 
land was taken for building imidugudu houses, the government decided that those who 
lived in the imidugudu should pay the compensation, leaving the mechanism to settle the 
issue to villager.  Rarely did the land owners receive the compensation since the new 
villagers either did not have anything to offer or refused to compensate due to some past 
enmity.67  The owners of the land also faced many difficulties in resuming their lives. 
They were either deprived of compensation, or the remaining farmland that they had, or 
the new farmland that they received in exchange, was too far from their residence.68 
Second, a failure to secure local participation in the planning process resulted in a poor 
sense of ownership among the communities, to the extent that some people considered 
that the houses they were living in belonged to the organization that constructed it.   
The land issue remained an enormous challenge for the government since many 
families were still landless and had to sustain themselves by cultivating small borrowed, 
or rented, plots.  Others worked on the land belonging to someone else for wages or in 
21 
exchange for the right to cultivate a small piece of land for themselves.  The UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs found that the imidugudu residents in the 
region of Bugesera depended on food aid for survival since they had less easy access to 
land.69  Naturally, those who lost their land in the process of creating the imidugudu 
suffered significant hardship. 
According to the consultations on national unity and reconciliation, land disputes 
were the greatest factor that hindered sustainable peace.70 These disputes ranged from 
conflicts over distribution of village plots, land redistribution operation, land exchange, 
inheritance and property violations.71  Even if land redistribution had been conducted 
efficiently and with some measure of equity, environmental degradation remains an 
unaddressed problem that continues to threaten the livelihood of the majority of the 
Rwandan population. 
Summary and Conclusions 
What lessons can be drawn from the Rwandan experience?  Were there economic 
signals of an impending genocide?  The relationship between resource scarcity and 
conflict in Rwanda appears to invoke the Malthusian argument that when population 
growth reaches the limit of subsistence, it will be held back by epidemics, infanticide, 
famine and war.72  The various positions in this debate are the anti-Malthusians, hard-
Malthusians, and the soft-Malthusians.73  
The first school of thought completely rejects the Malthusian argument and 
argues that there is no relationship between conflicts and resource scarcity.  Population 
growth stimulates knowledge creation, innovation, and economic growth74  Inventions 
and innovations, in this view, increase productivity, output, and carrying capacity.  
22 
Population growth may, in fact, significantly influence agricultural productivity; growth 
induces gains in productivity and output.75  The Malthusian threshold is irrelevant in this 
perspective as agricultural productivity will not decline to the point that resource scarcity 
induces conflict. 
Obviously, the optimistic perspective with respect to agricultural productivity 
cannot be applied to the case of Rwanda.  Habyarimana, for example, repeatedly refused 
to accept the return of refugees because Rwanda was overpopulated.  While Habyarimana 
may have other reasons for baring the return of refugees, one cannot deny that there was 
significant consensus among international governmental organizations and non-
governmental organizations that Rwanda was indeed overpopulated relative to its 
environmental carrying capacity.  Increases in population did not result in increased 
productivity through innovation or invention.  Increases in output occurred through the 
more intensive utilization of low-quality land and the increased effort of farmers, that is, 
agricultural productivity actually declined prior to the genocide.  Perhaps an intensive 
effort at land reform might have partially addressed this issue, but fiscal constraints 
prohibited significant investment in the agricultural sector.  It is unlikely that, in the case 
of Rwanda, agricultural productivity could have been sufficiently increased prior to the 
genocide to mitigate its underlying economic incentives. 
The second school of thought (‘hard’ Malthusian) hypothesizes that a direct 
relationship exists between overpopulation and resource scarcity.  Population increases 
exponentially while agriculture increases in a linear fashion. Eventually, population 
growth exceeds the subsistence level of agriculture.  Population growth induces 
environmental degradation, economic marginalization, and violent conflict.76  A succinct 
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and direct line of causation exists from population growth to violent conflict.  If one 
accepts this hypothesis, government policy should promote a reduction in the birth rate to 
mitigate conflict.  Government policy, however, should not merely focus on the growth 
of the population; it should also promote the effective use of natural resources.77  Without 
sufficient institutional constraints, common resources are likely to be depleted at a rate 
greater than their natural rate of replenishment, increasing competition for the remaining 
resources and the likelihood of conflict.  
Two potential flaws exist in the ‘hard’ Malthusian hypothesis.  First, for 
population growth to directly and significantly influence consumption and violent 
conflict, the potential influence of other causal variables is held constant.  Technology 
diffusion, for example, may significantly alter this relationship by allowing developing 
countries to bypass older technology.  Cell phone technology, for example, allows users 
in developing countries to bypass inefficient land-line networks.   Developing countries 
free ride on the research and development expenditures of developed countries.   In the 
case of Rwanda, resource constraints mitigated the potential impact of technology 
diffusion, especially after the dramatic decline in coffee and tin prices.  Second, the 
hypothesis relies on the concept of diminishing returns to increases in labor, that is, 
marginal product per worker falls with the addition of each new laborer in the agricultural 
sector.  While new investments and technology infusion may increase agricultural 
productivity, we may also see a perverse effect in that productivity increases may induce 
a decline in agricultural sector economic opportunities.  As farmers become more 
efficient, their demand for labor declines, increasing the supply of low-skilled, 
unemployed laborers. 
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While the arguments of the hard-Malthusians seem applicable to pre-genocide 
Rwanda, counter-factuals do exist.  Tanzania and Bangladesh have higher population 
densities and are as poor as Rwanda, yet have not experienced conflict on a proportional 
scale to that of Rwanda.78  It is also unlikely that the resource-constrained government 
could have actively promoted birth-control, especially given the active role of the Roman 
Catholic Church in health and education in Rwanda prior to the genocide.   
The third school of thought (‘soft’ Malthusians) argues that resource scarcity does 
not necessarily induce violent conflict.  Institutions and economic development can alter 
the relationship between scarcity and conflict.  While the potential exists for scarcity to 
spark a violent competition for resources, population growth is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for violent conflict to occur. 
Overpopulation, in the case of Rwanda, may have contributed to the conduct of 
the genocide as it increased the competition for scarce resources.  The government 
incentivized the conflict by awarding participants in the genocide the assets of those 
killed during the genocide.79  Overpopulation, however, was not the rationale for the 
genocide.  Political domination and a desire for an aggressive redistribution of economic 
assets, we argue, were the root causes of the genocide, not the desire to mitigate 
population density. 
The 1959-1963 conflict, for example, displaced significant numbers of Tutsi land 
owners whose lands were subsequently occupied by Hutu farmers.80   These farmers grew 
increasingly concerned that they would be forced off “their” lands as the RFP activities 
increased inside Rwanda in the early 1990s.81   When we couple this fear with 
environmental degradation and the economic crisis of 1984-1994, we can envision the 
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subtle pressures of declining incomes on Hutu farmers and the lack of economic 
opportunities for Hutu youth.  Finally, RFP activity resulted in the internal displacement 
of approximately one million Rwandans in the early 1990s, Rwandans who gathered in 
camps around Kigali.  These camps served as a recruiting ground for disaffected youth 
who served as the foot soldiers of the genocide.82 
In summary, the biased accumulation of human capital, environmental 
degradation, and economic marginalization combined to form a fertile ground for the 
genocide.  We must recognize, however, that these conditions may have been necessary 
for the genocide to occur but may have not been sufficient.  The genocide required a 
motivating force beyond mere ethnic hatred.  The creation of a set of incentives to 
motivate participation in the genocide, we believe, was the catalyst.  Without the 
government’s active policy of appropriating and redistribution Tutsi assets, the genocide 
may have been limited in scope and duration.  With the policy, there was a strong 
economic incentive to find and kill each member of a Tutsi household so that the 
household’s assets could be collected and redistributed.  The interaction between human 
capital accumulation and resource scarcity, we believe, contributed to the scope and pace 
of the Rwandan genocide. 
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Level of Education of the Active Population in 1992 (percentage)84 



















Some Educational and Employment Indicators before 199485 
 
Literacy (%) 52.1% 
Average education (at age of more than 25 years) 1.1 year 
School enrollment in 1990 (between 6 to 25 years) 39% 




Population below the poverty line 85% 
 
Table 4 
Use of Pastures, Cultivated Areas, Fallow Land and Forest in Hectares86 
 
Utilization 1970 1980 1986 Percentage of increase (+) 
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